in 1801, the advance was at length made, there

ensued one short, sharp, and, for perhaps ter

stendiness of the Egyptian soldiers and the

conspicuous gallantry and resource of

one or two of the field officers won the

day. Osman Digna suffered a defeat from

which he should never recover, and in

this portion of the Soudan there now, reigns

a degree of peace such as has not been known

there for nearly ten years. Now, as to the

present strength of the Egyptian army, on

May 1, 1802, it consisted of 14 battalions of

Infantry (8 Egyptian, 5 Soudanese, and 1 depoi

battalion, amounting in all to nearly 10,000

nen), 10 troops of cavalry (about 800 men)

3 field batteries and 1 garrison battalion (about

960 men'. 1 camel corps (300 men), besides

staff, military police, medical corps, engineers

transport companies, &c. There were 18 field

guns, and the total number of guns of position and machine guns was 160. The full estab-

lishment was 12,002 officers and men. This

army/cost, roughly speaking, nearly \$2,500.

000 a year, it is Mr. Milner's opinion

that this pative Egyptian corps is entirely

competent to maintain internal order, and to

defend Egypt from the dervishes, provided the

English officers are retained. For the moment

the distribution of the force is as follows: Or

the Nile frontier, 7 battalions; at Suakin and

Tokur, 35 battalions; at Cairo and Alexandria

lower Egypt is less than 3,000 men. For the

English army of occupation

battalions. The actual fighting force in all

moment, of course, this is supplemented by the

II.

In a chapter bearing the caption "The Race Against Bankruptey" Mr. Milner examines

the fiscal problems which confronted the Eng

lish occupiers of the Nile land and the meth

ods adopted for their solution. If any one had

suggested five years ago that the Egyptian ac-

counts would in 1801 show a large surplus he

would have been thought a lunatic. The race

standing the fact that the corvée, or system of

forced labor on public works, has been abol-

duced by 30 per cent., that the price of salt, which is a Government monopoly, has been

cut down by forty per cent., and that the tax

on shoep and goats, the tax on trades and

crafts, and a number of other vexatious minor

imposts have totally disappeared. The aston-

ishing improvement in the financial situation

has been attained on the one hand by a re-

funding of the foreign debt at lower rates

of interest, and on the other by a diminution

of the pension list and the number of super-

fluous officials, and generally by the preven-

tion of waste on the part of the Administra-

tion. Another great factor concerned in the

financial recuperation of Egypt has been the de-

velopment of the productive powers of the coun-

try. The result is that not only is the interest

on the debt duly paid, but there is a surplus

in the Egyptian treasury. At the end of 1885

Egypt had not a penny in reserve whether in

the hands of the Caisse or in those of the Gov-

ernment. At the close of 1891 the Caisse had

a reserve fund of £1.822,000 (Egyptian), the

(Egyptian), and there was besides a third re-

serve fund of £324,000, consisting of the econ-

which France had insisted on locking up

Altogether. Fgypt has now nearly three mil

lions in hand against a rainy day. It is true

that the dont of Egypt has estensibly under

gone a slight increase. After the readjust-

ment of the fl ances resulting from the Con

vention at London the debt stood at £104,000,

000. On July 31 the figures were £106,458.

000. The increase, however, is not all due to fresh borrowing. About half of it represents

the addition to capital necessitated by con-

upon that operation. The total amount of

tesh borrowing is £1,405,000, and this has

been entirely devoted to the redemption of pen-

add less than a million and a half sterling to

your debt while reducing your interest by

more than three hundred thousand and in-

creasing your annual revenue by more than

million is beither rash nor unprofit-

ble finance. But it may to asked: Why bor-

row at all? Is there not an anomaly in borrowing on the one hand, while piling up a

reserve fund on the other? The objection is

cumstances of Egypt. It was a fatal flaw of the

fir-t reform introduced by international com-

bination into Egyptian finance that no pro-

ision was made for a reserve fund. At that

time the great object was to keep down the

which is exceptionally liable to be affected by physical conditions; an abnormally high or

an abnormally low Nile may, in any given year,

completely upset the budget, although the

general position of the finances of the country

s thoroughly sound. Under these conditions

The increase in the amount of agricultural

roduce, coupled with the decrease of extor-

tion, has worked a complete transformation in

the condition of the fellah. Even six years ago

every book or report about Egypt was full of

gloomy forebodings based upon the indebted-

ness of the peasantry. The indebtedness is

still heavy in many quarters, but it is no

longer, in the great majority of cases, over-

whelming. It no longer threatens Egypt with

a dissolution of secial order. The problem of

feserve fund is of undoubted necessity.

But Egypt is a country the revenue of

not well founded, in view of the peculiar

sions and to reproductive public works,

ersion, and is far more than counterbalanced by the great reduction in interest consequen

omies effected by the conversion of the debt

lovernment had a reserve fund of £005,000

Egypt the land tax has been re

minutes, doubtful engagement.

P) has long been known to students o Prench history that Mr. JOHN CODMAN ROPES of Boston is one of the highest authorities on the career of Napoleon Bonaparte, and cane cially with regard to the campaign of Waterloo which has been the subject of much controver sy. What should probably be accounted the final word upon the latter subject is now presented by Mr. Rorks in a large octavo volum entitled The Campaign of Waterloo (Scribners). The parrative in which the questions raised lifary historians are acutely and exhaustively discussed is accompanied and elucidated by an atlas comprising a number of maps, on which the eye may follow the moveents of Napoleon and those of his opponents. The method of discussion adopted by the author is that followed by Col. Chesney in his Waterloo lectures. That is to say, the chapters first contain a statement or parrative and afterward notes, in which are examined the various controversies concerning this campaign. Those persons who do not care about the controversy and prefer a continuous narrative can read the chapters seriatim.

In one of his later chapters Mr. Ropes sums up the principal points treated of in his narrative, and which, taken collectively, form the justification for his book. Chief among these points is Napoleon's plan of campaign. gard to this, the author has followed the Emperor's own account, and points out the difference between it and the plan which it has been elaimed he either really did entertain or ought to have entertained. In regard to the much debated question of the alleged verbal order to Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras on the afternoon of the 15th of June, new light has been thrown by Mr. Ropes. The contemporaneous evidence of the bulletin and the statement made by Marshal Grouchy in 1818 make it very difficult to distelleve Napoleon's account of this matter. It is demonstrated by Marshal Nev's orders to his command and from other evidence furnished by his defenders that his arrangements for carrying out his instructions on the 16th were extremely defective. and in fact, that he perversely departed from the letter and spirit of his order. It is also shown that a vigorous and unhesitating compliance with the orders which he received ould, in all probability, have changed the issue of the campaign. The view of those writers who regard it as great negligence on the part of Napoleon that on the morning of the 17th he did not take rdequate measures to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat is fully adopted by Mr. Ropes. It is also made clear that Grouchy was at Walhain and not at Sart-a-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo. It is maintained that Marshal Grouchy, if he had started for the Bridge of Moustier at daybreak or had followed the advice of Gerard at noon, would probably have stopped the advance of the Prussians by engaging them, in which case Napoleon would have been able to employ his whole army against that of Wellington, and would have defeated it. It is pointed out that from about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 18th of June to about halt-past & Napoleon's attention was absorbed by the attack of the Prussians upon the right and rear of the French army, and that for the mistakes committed during this period in the assault on the English army Ney is mainly responsible. It is furthermore shows that by reason of this distraction of the Emperor's attention from the operations in his front valuable opportunities for success against Wellington were lost.

As to the conduct of the allies, it is contended that the definite understanding as to the steps to be taken in the event of a French invasion of Belgium, which is generally attributed to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, did not exist. Mr. Ropes concedes that the Duke of Wellington, in issuing the orders for concentrating at Quatre Bras after he had become satisfied tha Napoleon was concentrating in front of Bincher, was acting in strict acc the demands of the situation. But our author points out that it was several hours after Welington had gained this information as to Blücher and Napoleon before he issued the order, and that this delay was not only uncalled for, but that it gravely imperilled the mecess of the allies. Attention is called to the now admitted fact that it was not until the early morning hours of the 18th that Blücher was able to give Wellington definite assurance of his support in the battle of Waterloo.

11.

Now let us state the conclusions at which Mr. Ropes arrives with regard to Napoleon's management of the Waterloo campaign. He peror can be charged with any lack of activity or decision of character at this crisis of his career, except on the morning after the battle of Ligny, when he was apparently pretty well tired out. His energies speedlly returned. however, and we find him conducting the pursuit of the English during the afternoon and naking an examination of their position in the mud and rain in the middle of the night. Mr. Ropes also differs from many other writers on the subject, in that he can discern defect in Napoleon's plan of campaign. Had Ney executed his orders with promptness. the campaign would have been finished on the 16th of June, either by Ney's furnishing the force to take the Prussians in rear at Bryand Wagnelée or by his defeating Walling. ton badly by the help of the First Corps. If either of these things had happened there could t possibly have been any battle of Waterloo; the Prussian and English armies would have been separated: one and perhaps both would have been beaten, and never in all probability they have acted together again. For this failure to achieve success on the second day of the campaign Ney and not Napoleon

Was responsible.

On the other hand, no one but Napoleon was responsible for not overwhelming at Quatra Bras on the early morning of the 17th the two-thirds of Wellington's army which had been collected there. His failure to do this is attributed to his excessive fatigue. Then again, for the neglect to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat on the same morning Napoleon is responsible. Soult ought to have attended to this in his capacity as chief of staff. Yet, as the Emperor does not seem to have blamed him for not having reconnoitred in the direction of Wavre. Napoleon is pronounced open to censure on the score of negligence. It is true that it was not likely that er had retired in the direction of Wavre; but it was of vital importance to know whether had or not. Napoleon is also solely responalble for having persisted in his original design of detaching Grouchy in pursuit of the Prussians after he had reason believe that they were intending to unite with the English, and to suspect. that they had been approaching the English during the previous night and morn ing. He is blameworthy for contenting himself with merely giving Grouphy a warning that this might be their intention. He thus laid upon Grouchy a burden which to that er. as Napoleon was well aware, was entirely new. Hence the Emperor was not warranted in risking so much on the chance of Grouchy's being able to austain the burden It is this, we repeat, for which Napoleon is, in Mr. Ropes's judgment, censurable, namely, for having, when he saw that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English, persist ed in adhering to his original plan of sending Grouchy in pursuit of the former with two army corps-a plan devised when he and Grouchy and everybody else supposed that the Prussians had gone to Namur. Many writers contend that Napoleon did not in the least foresee the flank murch of the Prussians. Mr. Ropes concedes that this may be true, if to foresce means to expect But Napoleon certainly did. at 1 P. M. of the 17th, recognize the presibility of the Prusplane uniting with the English, and, to Mr.
Suprem to beams to have suproted himself to
spitiolous by the least that having such a suncontraction of his enemies in mind over as

possibility, he should have detached Grouchy with 33,000 men from the main army and been content to rely on Grouchy being able to prevent this project of the Prussian from being carried out. It is also submitted that Napoleon's neglect to send Grouchy any information of his own situation, and any or ders as to what he expected him to do if he ound the Prussians were marching to join Wellington, was an unjustifiable reliance on the favors of fortune.

TIE.

On Marshal Grouchy Mr. Ropes would put the lame of having entirely failed to apprehend his mission as indicated to him by the express warning contained in the Bertrand order Had he acted in accordance with the informaion which he acquired on the night of the 17th and 18th he could have prevented the Emperor from being overwhelmed by both the allied armies. At daybreak, as appears from a letter written by himself, he knew that the Prussians had retired toward Wavre and Brussels. But the meaning of this fact he utterly failed to grasp. He made no change in his previously rdered dispositions which this news should have shown him were wholly unsuited to the situation as now ascertained. Nor did the sound of the cannon of Waterleo produce or him a greater effect. He would not accet the suggestion of Gerard. He persisted in a course which completely isolated his command and prevented it from playing any part in the events of that memorable day. Napoleon on his part made a great mistake in trusting so much to Grouchy's good judgment; he took a wholly unnecessary risk; he might as well as not have taken Grouchy and far the larger part of his command with the main army. Had he done so, Mr. Ropes believes that the catastrophe of Waterloo could not have happened. Had Grouchy on his side acted up to the demands of the situation, he also would have averted the ruin which the unhindered union of the allies brought upon Napoleon and his army.

In an appendix Mr. Ropes discusses some characteristics of Napoleon's memoirs, and directs attention to a peculiarity of Napoleon's which explains the existence of certain definite statements which are apparently wide of the truth. This peculiarity was that while his orders to licutenants were often very general in their character-pointing out clearly enough the thing to be aimed at, but leaving entirely to the officer the course to be adopted-yet these orders never seem to have been retained in Napeleon's memory in the shape in which they were given; but what he did recall about them was his expectation that on receiving his orders his lieutenant would act in such and such a manner. This expectation was all that was left of the order in his mind; and when at St. Helena he came to write his narrative, he would often state that he had given definite instructions to such or such an effect, when all he had really done was to give a general order, from the giving of which he expected such or such a course of action to be taken by his subordinate. Thus, Mr. Ropes does not believe that Napoleon sent to Grouchy any such order as that which he gives in his memoirs On the other hand. Mr. Ropes does believe that the Emperor sent the Marshal the Bertrand order, though he does not even mention it in his memoirs, and apparently had forgotten all about it. The inference is that, having a distinct recollection of having sent Grouchy an order, and also a very distinct recollection of what he expected would do when he got the order. Napoleon fused the two things in his mind and reproduced the order in the terms of his expecta-There is, as Mr. Ropes points out, tions nothing very uncommon about this. It is certainly to be distinguished from deliberate misrepresentation. It is partly, at any rate, the result of an active imagination working on facts imperfectly recollected, but which have been dwelt upon until the mind has become disturbed and warped.

England in Egypt.

The most powerful plea yet made for the maintenance of England's present relations with the Nile country is presented in a volume of some 450 pages entitled England in Egypt, by ALPEED MILNER (Macmillans). The author was lately Under Secretary for Finance at Cairo, and the book before us is the outcome of his experience and inquiries during a residence of several years in Feynt. It would be difficult to overrate the value of Mr. Milner's re searches, or the effectiveness with which his store of information is set forth. He has undoubtedly produced the only work in the English language which unravels and elucidates the extraordinary complications, surprises, and paradoxes in the political and financial condition of the Nile Valley.

It is now more than ten years since, on Sept. 13 1882, a British army stormed the earthworks of Tel-el-Kebir and put an end to the hopes and plans of Arabi Pasha. What were the duties and responsibilities which the English then assumed, and how have they discharged them? To answer this question; and escribe the obstacles surmounted or evaded, is the purpose of this volume.

What have been the theoretical powers of England in Egypt during the last decade? Practically, she has been mistress of the country by virtue of her army of occupation; but, since she has not chosen to annex Egypt or to assert a formal protectorate over it, we must confine ourselves to the functions which in theory are vested in her. She is one of the fifteen powers who, in pursuance of the socalled capitulations, arrogate certain fiscal and judicial immunities for their own subjects resident in Egypt. She is one of the fourteen powers represented on the mixed ribunals, which in all civil causes and to some extent in criminal causes wherein preigners are concerned, have superseded the jurisdiction of the former Consular courts. She is one of the six great powers who are represented in the Calsse de la Dotte or International Commission of the Debt owed by Egypt to foreigners. She is lastly one of the two European powers-France being the other-which are represented conjointly with the Khedive on the so-called Daira and Domains Commissions, which manage in the interest of creditors the estates which formerly belonged respectively to the Khedive and the Khedivial family. England has also undertaken by means of English officers to reorganize the native Egyptian army, but such office a receive their commissions from the Khedive, and are in theory accountable to no It is obvious that in the mixed tribunals and in the several international comnissions named, England, although she is de facto the upholder of peace and order in the country, may be thwarted by other foreign powers who have assumed no responsibility. No more involved, difficult, and delicate situation has ever taxed the self-control and the ngenuity of a statesman.

The problems which England has had to solve in Egypt during the last ten years are these: to convert the fellah or native Egyptian agriculturist into a soldier, to avert impending bankruptey, to so improve the means of trri gation as to assure a supply of water adequate to the industrial necessities of the country. and finally to effect some indispensable amendments in the administration of justice. Then have been some odds and ends of reform at which we may subsequently glance, but those pecified have principally engaged the attention of the English guardians of Ezypt.

The problem of the military defence of Egypt, as it presented itself immediately after the British occupation, was one of the most puzzling that could be conceived. Only one thing was clear; the existing army, that had been commanded by Arabi l'asha and wrecked at Tel-el-Kebir, was useless. "The Egyptian army is dispanded." was announced by the decree of Dec. 20, 1882, which met with unanimous approval. What was to take its place? Ninety-nine men out of a hundred would certainly have answered that it could not be a

the defence of the country to its own inhabitanta. Obviously, if the thing was possible, this was incomparably the best plan, and Bir Evelyn Wood was prepared to try it. It turned out that the material was not so very bad after all. No one would pretend that the Exptian peasant, in his native condition. ranks very high as a fighting animal. Still ne is not wanting in certain qualities which go a long way in the composition of a soldier. As a rule, he is healthy, well built, active, easily led, and not easily overcome by hardships. Moreover, he is intelligent, docile, and, though wanting in dash, not lacking a certain fearless ness in the presence of danger. It is the lastnamed quality which has on various occasions rendered the Egyptian soldier steady and calm under a harassing fire, sufficient to a charge or hand-to-hand fight might be much better than he is. We may call it insensibility to danger and not true courage; but call it what we will, it is an extremely valu able quality in war. An officer of Mr. Milner's acquaintance who has had many opportuni ties of seeing the fellahin fight, declares that sehind defences they can be made as good as any troops in the world; while in the open, if they only have confidence in their leaders, they are fair average soldiers. The fact is that good leadership is simply everything with Egyptians. The fellah has little individuality or initiative in the field. But he is capable o showing plenty of courage under officers whom he believes in. Why is it, then, that the fellahin have become a byword for cow Why would they run away ardice? mere handful of half-naked Arabs armed with spears, when they had only to stand still and shoot in order to be perfectly safe? The answer must be sought in the treatment to which they had previously been subjected. The feliah more than most men requires training to make him a fighter, and he had not had it. More than most men he is easy to de moralize by bad management, and he had had nothing else. On the one hand, he was never properly taught his business; and on the other, he was exposed to an amount of degrading ill usage which would have knocked the manliness out of a Viking. His officers, a miscellaneous crowd, selected on no principle and promoted for anything but merit were quite unable to keep up real discipline, but at the same time they banged their men about in the most cruel and disheartening manner. The rank and file were wretchedly paid, and the little pay they were entitled to was often intercepted. There were no arrangements for the comfort of the men. The barracks were filthy beyond description. Provision for the sick and wounded simply did not exist. Worst of all, perhaps, although there were laws regulating the length of military service, they were completely disregarded. No wonder that large numbers of the population were even in childhood maimed or blinded in order that they might escape the terrible fate of having to serve their country. Under such circumstances what could be more unreasonable than to complain of a want of spirit in the Egyptian army?

Plainly the first thing to do was to reverse all this, and it was reversed. The conscrip-tion of an army of 6,000 men, the number originally fixed was not a great tax upon a population of 0.000,000, and the men were soon got together. Once enrolled, they found themselves properly fed, clothed, and housed. Discipline was strict, and as long as they con ducted themselves well they were absolutely safe from oppression. Their pay was reason able in amount, and it was never stopped, except for misconduct. They were looked after when ill. One of the first things which inspired respect and confidence on the part of the soldier in his new officers was the fearless devotion which some of the latter showed in trying to save the lives of their subordinates during the cholera. A very great impression was likewise made by the fact that the conscripts were now not only entitled to leave, but regularly allowed to take it. The reappearance of the fellah soldier in his native village, after an absence of a year in barracks-not crawling back mutilated or smitten by some fatal disease, but simply walking in as a visitor, healthy, well dressed and with some money in his pocket-was like

the vision of a man risen from the dead." Having thus rapidly won the confidence of their men, the new officers had not much diffleulty in knocking them into fair military shape. Here the fellah's quickness, submisiveness, and positive fondness for drill were of the greatest assistance Mr. Milner menions an amusing proof of this predilection that the soldiers had actually to be prevented from practising their drill in their leisure hours. Of course, time was required to create that very complicated piece of machinery, a expedition up the Nile, the native Egyptian troops were principally engaged in guarding the long line of communications which extended from Assint to Korti. By April, 1886, however, the defence of the frontier post at Wadi Halfa was condided entirely to the keeping of the Egyptian army, a British force being, nevertheless, for some time longer stationed at Assump, 200 miles to the north, in case of emergency. But this reserve was never called upon for assistance. Its numbers were gradually reduced, and by January, 1888, the last British detachment was withdrawn from that part of the country. Since that time the Egyptian army has proved itself equal to the task of protecting Egypt from the northward pressure of the Soudanese rebels. At Suakin, too, where, in 1881 and 1885, an imposing display of British military force had been considered necessary, Egyptian troops, toward the close of the latter year, took over the whole defence, and, except for a few months in the end of 1888, they have conducted it unaided ever since. The extension of the duties of the army had involved an increase of its numbers. Had its work been confined to main taining internal order and keeping in awe the Sedouins on the eastern and western frontiers of Egypt-this was all for which it was originally intended-the number of 6,000 men first fixed might have sufficed. But if it was expected to ward off single handed the invasion threatened from the far south, the number vas evidently inadequate. At the end of 188% the infantry still consisted of only eight but alions recruited exclusively from the lella hin. But in May, 1884, there was raised at Sua kin a ninth battalion composed of Soudanese negroids—the first of the five black regiments which supply the picturesque and dashing element in the Egyptian military history of recent times. As to those soldiers, Mr. Milner tells us that the term black is no exaggeration. Their hue is truly of the Suspest obony. They are not natives of Egypt, but belong for the most part to the Shitluk and Dinka tribes that are found on the Uppe: Nile from so ne little distance above Khartoum up to the Equatorial Province. Others come from the west beyon t Kordofan, and even from as far as Bornu. It build they are not exactly what in northern countries would be described as fine men The Dinka and Shilluk are tall, but slight and have narrow shoul lers, with skinny arm and legs. Their lungs are delicate, and great care has to by taken with their clothing to protect them from catching cold. The men from the western districts are shorter and thicker set, but even they could not be called robust. Yet they are all of springy gait and clastic movement, as active as cats and animated with a real love of tighting, especially against the Arabs of the Soudan, their hereditary enemies and oppressors In civilization they are far below the inhabitants of Exept. They are, indeed, mere children, but under office s who know how to ommand their respect and win their affect tions they have all a chill's docility and devotion. As soldiers the blacks are the very reverse of the Egyptians. They are not quick at drill or fond of it. What they are fond of, and and what they shine in is real battle. It is true they have little sung froid. They easily get excited and are hard to hold. The difficulty is to prevent them from firing too fast or charging too soon. But when it actually ended to given quarters, to energing ur re-ceiving a charge than they have fur gamele.

In this respect to the fellah than those to which he atill has to submit is doubtful, however one of capital importance. But, compared with the rates formerly prevalent, the interest at hout British officers at their managed present paid is moderate. Mr. Milner cor nead. Hence, it has come about that while o re is much yet to be done in lighten the eight fetials regiments only four have British Colonels and Majors, the others being ing the burdens of the people in this respec But no mere financial arrangements, bowever entirely officered by natives, the five Boudan wise, can equal the relief already afforded and me regiments are all under British superlo hereafter to be afforded in still larger measflicers. Unquestionably the addition of this ure by the attention now and henceforth to be black element has greatly strengthened the given to the great primary need—the regular supply of water. In truth, the revival of agri-Egyptian army and still constitutes its most striking feature as a fighting force. Yet, accord cultural prosperity in Egypt during the last few years is no artificial one. It rests upo ing to Mr. Milner, we should not assume that solid foundations, and, striking as it has been. the native Egyptians are of small accoun there is no reason why, with sensible management and fairly good luck, it should not conin the composition of the army. No doubt the blacks have borne the chief brunt of attacks in the majority of the engagements, and they tinue until it reaches proportions of which few are the men whom a commander would mos men have at present any conception. I is all a question of water. If the water supply were increased by means of a system readily pit against the daring of the dervishes Still, they have not done all the work. The native Egyptians, who have fought side by of storage, the cultivable area might be enor side with them in more than one critical strug mously extended. Hundreds of thousands of gle, deserve their share of the credit of victory acres might be restored to fertility, while other large tracts might be made to bear The truth is that the two sets of men, with their widely differing qualities, form a very strong combination for fighting purposes. crops for the first time or to bear two crops year where they now produce only one. With This has been proved on two memorable oc the expansion of agriculture trade would reensions. The long threatened invasion of the celve an enormous impetus. There is no coundervishes from the south took place in the summer of 1880. An army of try in the world of which it is so true as of Egypt that the application of capital is necessary to elicit its great native wealth. The recent ox five thousand men was put forward under Wad el Nejumi, the ablest Lieutenant of the Khalifa penditure of the Government on public works Abdullah. In was Wad el Nejumi who over-threw Hicks and who led the final attack on has been reproductive to a degree surpassing the most audacious forecast. But there is Khartoum. It was he who in the eyes of the much more to be done in this direction. faithful was destined to plant the standard of The time will soon be reached when the the true Mahdi on the citadel of Cairo. It was amount of water at present available in at Toski, on Aug. 3, 1889, that Wad el Nejum the summer months will have been made to encountered the native Egyptian forces under render the greatest service of which it is capa-Gen. Grenfell and Col. Wodehouse. ble. After that there can be no considerable stride forward until the supply is augmented. dervishes rushed to the attack with their usual splendid bravery, but their end was an-If the amount of summer water could be nihilation. Neiumi himself, almost all of his doubled, or even increased by fifty per cent. principal Captains, and nearly half of his fightthe effect on agriculture would be stupendous. The creation of a vast reservoir to collect the ing men were killed; the rest were scattered to the winds. The victory at Toski has had river water in the months of abundance in order to give it out again in the months of far-reaching consequences. For the two years previous to it the country between Wadi Halfa drought is, therefore, the most interesting and Assuan was utterly unsafe. The people problem which now confronts not only the en gincers but the financiers of Egypt. lived in terror of their lives. Now all this is nearly as quiet as Lower Egypt question of the struggle for water. Mr. Milher What Toski did for the southern frontier, the devotes a separate chapter. engagement at Afast in the spring of 1801 has done for the Red Sea littoral and for the important district depending on Suakin. Up to that time Sunkin had for years been practically beleagured, the dervishes under Osman Digna having an admirable base of operation in the fertile delta of Tokar. It took severa years to obtain the consent of the British Government to an advance upon Tokar, but when

The result of ten years' work in the irrigation department of the Egyptian Government is summed up in the statement that the very most is now made of the existing resources of the country in the way of water. while the dangers incident to a high flood are reduced to a minimum. There remains the great problem whether the water available for irrigation may not be largely increased by creation of one or more reservoirs. which shall retain part of the superfluous discharge of the flood or winter seasons, in order to increase the supply during the succeeding summers. The creation of a reservoir is indeed the burning question of Egyptian irrigation at the present day. Into the comparative merits of the various pro posed sites and projects Mr. Milner does not enter, for the reason that the Egyptian Gov ernment has decided to submit the competing schemes to a commission of experts, and h deems it folly for an unscientific writer to try to forestall the decision of such a body. He confines himself to pointing out the extent of the benefit which Egypt might derive from the execution of such a scheme. The culti-vated area of Egypt is about 5,000,000 acres. of which 2,800,000 acres are in Lower and 2,200,000 in Upper. With an augmented supply of water, cultivation in both parts of the country might be greatly increased the increase would take the form of additional and, either reclaimed or brought under culti vation for the first time; in Upper Egypt if would take the form not of an extension of the cultivated area, but of the introduction of summer culture in districts which at present only bear crops in the winter and spring. What is the extreme limit of possible extension in either case? The total amount of land which could possibly be cultivated in Lower Egypt is estimated by Mr. Milner 4.800,000 acres-that is to say, 2.000,000 more than now - of which about thirds would be land reclaimed, and the rest land cultivated for the first time Yet not for a moment does he imagine that either the enterprise, the money, or the labor for so great an extension as this could be forthcoming in the next fifty years, even if the water were found. The utmost which any same advocate of the reservoir scheme contemplates as within immediate prospect is an addition of 600,000 acres to the cultivated area of the delta. Even this amount would add very greatly to ished, that in the least prosperous parts of the wealth of the country. Ordinary delta land. even at the pre bear crops worth at least £5 an acre. So here is a certain promise of £3,000,000 a year if the necessary water could be obtained in summer.

In Upper Egypt the problem is different All the cultivable land is already under crops in the winter time. What the advocates of reservoir urge is that, given the extra water it would be highly advantageous to assimilate the culture of Upper to that of Lower Egypt by introducing in the former a system o perennial irrigation. Mr. Milner, for his own part, deems it problematic whether the proposed conversion of all the basins in Upper Egypt into Sell or summer cultivation tracks would not be accompanied by great disadvantages. He thinks the project much more doubtful practicability that of reclaiming the six hundred thousand acres in Lower Egypt. If success fully carried out, however, it would, as its advocates malatain, add four million pounds sterling to the annual value of the produce of Upper Egypt. In order to execute both of the above schemes, the amount of storage water required would be enormous. Mr. Milner is convinced that Egypt may be well content if by the end of this century she finds herself in possession of a reservoir adding five hundred thousand acres, four hundred thousand in Lower and one hundred thousand in Upper Egypt, to the average area under summer crops. Such an increase would be small compared with the gigantic schemes which haunt some people's imagination including those who have most carefully studied ancient Egyptian history. Still, even the modest plan recommended by our author would add three or four millions sterling year to the produce of the country. II, as Sin Colin Monerieff has estimated, the negestary reservoir, together with all subsidiary works. could be constructed for £2,600,000, it would be about the best investment of money that could be conceived. Assume that it would cost nearly double what Sir Colin estimates, and even then the reservoir would bring Egypt : net profit ten times as great as the expense of its creation within the lifetime of one genera

But who is to construct the reservoir and how is the money to be got? Pgypt cannot borrow money without the consent of Turkey, and, even with that consent, she could sourcely charge her budget with the annuity necessary for the requisite new loan without the consent of the six principal powers to her adding that sum to her authorized expenditure. There are no doubt, the economies resulting from the conversion of the debt, which amount to £300,000 a year, and which could not be better employed than in defraying the annual charge for the new loan. But here again nothing could be done. without the consent of the powers. he has no hope of seeing it, what Mr. Milner would like to see would be the construction of the reservoir at England's expense. He points out that on the one hand Fayit has not cost Great Britain a penny, while on the other hand the latter country has made a great deal of noncy at the expense of the Nice land. tixteen or seventeen years ago Ingland bought for \$20,000,000 Egypt's interest in the Suez Canal, which, had Egypt only clung to it, would soon have become a tertile source of income to her. What England bought for \$20.-000,000 will in another year or two be worth -Me tary a very chermone englishes of a voct on-

traordinary act of generosity on the part of Great Britain if she were to devote one-quarter of the clear profit which she has made out of this fortunate transaction to the benefit of the country at whose expense it has been made especially when that country is one whose interests are so intimately bound up, econo ically and politically, with those of England

IV. One of the matters to which England's repre

sentatives at Calro have given special atten

on the working of the Commissions of Brigan dage, which showed up the irregularities, the injustice, and the cruelty of these quanttribunals in the most startling light. Evelyn Baring now began to press for their abolition. Risz Pasha, though somewhat reluctant and professing himself doubtful of the accuracy of the gravest charges brought against the Commissions, ultimately gave way and, in May, 1880, they were suppressed. A first great step had thus been taken. but it necessarily involved further meas The Commissions had been established because the native courts were incompetent to grapple with crime. Evidently the suppression of the former did not by itself make the latter less incompetent. On the contrary, the question of improving the courts presented itself in a more urgent form than before. Baring proposed to strengthen them by increasing the number of European Judges. This time the resistance was more serious, but, in the end, he again carried his point, and in November, 1889, two additional Englishmen were appointed to the Native Court of Appeals, making in all three Englishmen and three Belgians. To multiply however. European Judges in the native courts was only to multiply witnesses to their ineff cleney. The more the true state of the case was brought to light, the clearer it besame that some radical reform was needed. The British Consul-General, therefore, urged the temporary appointment of an eminent Indian Judge to examine the whole system of native jurisprudence, and to make proposals for its amendment. The suggestion was adopted, and in the spring of 1890 Mr. Scott. a Judge of the High Court of Bombay, came to Egypt and advised on the question. He was appointed in the first instance for one year. and by the end of 1800 he made his report. Without condemning the procedure of the native courts in toto, or taking a despondent view of their possible future, he suggested a number of important changes, and, above all, pointed out the necessity of a great improvement in Notwithstanding the resisttheir personnel. ance offered by the Khedive's Ministers and the French Consul-General, Mr. Scott's proposals were accepted, and he himself was appointed to a permanent post. This appointment has resulted in one of the greatest strides yet made by Egypt in the direction of ultimate self-government. If the native courts go on improving as they have improved within the

and the so-called mixed tribunals. It is impossible to read Mr. Milner's book without acquiescing in his conclusions that the occupation of the Nile country by England has been of immense advantage to the Egyptian people. On the one hand, the burdens of the fellahin have been greatly lightened. while on the other, the rights of the Egyptian bondholders are now absolutely secured. Mr. Milner denies, however, that the interest of the bondholders has ever been the inspiring motives of England's policy in Egypt, and least of all during recent years. The predominant motive of that policy has been the welfare of the Egyptian people.

last two years, they will open a way out of the

ONE TOUCH OF SENTIMENT.

The Efforts of the Poor to Save Their Dead

from a Potter's Field Burial. When a person dies in any of the hospitals belonging to the city it is the duty of the officials to notify such of his friends as they know of, and to wait at least twenty-four hours before making any disposition of the body. I the friends do not call, one of the various medical institutions may get it, or it may be interred in Potter's Field. Naturally, the hospital officials are anxious to have the body disposed of as soon as possible, but sometimes this desire is frustrated.

On a recent afternoon a couple called at the

and made him shut his teeth very suddenly. The orderly looked very dubious, but he secured the certificate and gave it to the woman. "You must take the body away by to-morrow," he said firmly, but not unkindly.
"I will," she said, and walked out, followed by her brother, who looked mystified.
"Why did you insist upon her removing the body at once?" asked the reporter, who had overheard the conversation.

"Because we have a good deal of trouble with cases of this kind," rethed the orderly, "I don't besieve these people will remove the body. Not that they don't want to but they are too poor to my it. In all likelihood they will go around among their neighbors, and perhaps to the Aberman and Assemblyman of their district, and try to raise enough mone; to say the inneral expenses, reclups they will succeed, but the chances are they work. You see, their neighbors are likely to be no richer than they are, and winte they united they won to ende to. As for the politicians, they have a good many calls on their charity, you know.

"It frequently happens that the relatives of noor people who die here come and get the certificat s, promising to remove the bolles, and then never some each. They are unable to raise the tuneral expenses and are afraid to come tack. The worst part of it is that they keep the certificates when they get the rectificates when they are to make out duplicates and go through a lot of red tage to explain why duplicates were necessary. Some of these cases are very sai. The relatives know when they get the certificates that it will be practically impossible for them to use town, but they hope for some stroke of linek to enable them to raise the money. I have frequently loven surprised at the feeling shown by people against allowing the city to a rytheir relatives. Men and woman who are usually indifferent to keep the bodies of friends and relatives from Potter's Field and whose lives are most wretched and hardened. Will go to any lengths to keep the bodies of friends and relatives. They have a special

ror of the latter.

"Same of the relatives don't deserve so much sampathy. They are young toughs, and get the certificates to display to their friends. It is more vanity with them. They usually know, too, that they cause us trouble, and they rather enjoy that."

Not an Affair of the Heart.

They stood at her door and there seemed to They stood at her door and here seemed to be some constraint between them.

He was a trifle older than she; and she had the advantage of him in looks too.

In his e.es there was supplication, and in hers there were disdain, scorn, rejection.

"If I might—"he began.

"No. sir." she interrupted. "It is totally unnecessary."

[Put—"

"Hut—"
"Lide not wish to hear you."
"One word—"
"Not one, sir."
"Weil, if you won't—"
"I want nothing you can offer me."
"But I—"
"Once for all, I tell you I want no tinware order." She shut the door and went in, and the ped-dier want as to the sext house.

relong her winter stay in the Isle of Wight

OUREN VICTORIA'S HOME. Which othe and He LONDON, Jan. 22.—The Queen has decided to

beyond the date usually fixed for her departure. For a great many years now it has been the custom of the Court to pass Christmas at Osborne, and to that residence the various items of traditional Christmas fare-the baren of beef, the gigantic turkeys, the boar's beadare forwarded from her Majosty's other tion is judicial reform. The two greatest evils mains, while at her orders ber annual bounonnected with the administration of justice ties are distributed in England and Scotland. in Egypt were the incompetence of the native Osporne House has always been a great facourts, and the arbitrariness of the Commisvorite with the Queen; indeed, were her parsions of Brigandage. In October, 1887, a Beigian, M. Legrelle, was appointed Protiality for Balmoral not such an accepted fact, it might almost be said that it was the favorite sussur-General, and was encouraged to make par excellence. There she leads a more pria radical examination of existing evils. Thus vate and free existence, bave for the occaassured of support. M. Legrelle produced. sional visits of her Ministers and the despatch in the course of 1888, a most elaborate report of the affairs of the State, which she never neglects, she lives at Osborne like some wealthy, unpretentious private landowner. With the exception of the reception given to the Admiral and officers of the French squadron in August last, there has been no official o) at visit in the Isle of Wight since Napoleon Ill. came there in 1857 as her guest.

Although the meeting of sovereigns in each other's dominions have not as a rule the extreme political importance with which the public invests them, yet they entail a certain ceremonial, the fulfilment of a stated programme, which invariably includes a grand review of the naval or military forces. The guest assumes the uniform of the regiment in the foreign land of which he is generally honorary chief, and the host returns the compliment on the same lines; but the circumscribed area on the Isle of Wight is ill adapted for a large display of forces, and, save on rare occasions, it is difficult to gather the whole of the British fleet in the waters of the Solent. Moreover, Osborne House has by no means the room requisite for the accommodation of a number of illustrious guests, such as Windsor Castle possesses, and even with the recent additions it is no more than sufficient for the Queen, her suite, and the many children, grand and great-grand-children, which it is nor pleasure to see around her there. As it

recent additions it is no more than sufficient for the Queen, her suite, and the many children, grand and great-grand-children, which it is ner pleasure to see a round her there. As it is her own private property, she justify considers that she is exempted from the obligation of making it the seene of official receptions, and enjoys the immunities the lact content.

The etymology of the name of Osborne has never been doinitely settled. Some believe it to be the corruption of Outsirbourne, formerly given to the locality on account of the large number of bivalves found on the adjacent shores. Others are of the opinion that the name comes from William Fitz Usborne, to whom the Isle of Wight the Vecta or Vectas of the doining the treatment of the large number of bivalves found in the portioning of the land after the Norman conquest. Whichever interpretation is adopted, it gives indication that the domain was recognized in a remote antiquity.

After having belonged to the Bowermans, an old family of isle of Wight origin, it passed into the hands of a certain Eustace Mann, who, during the troubled times of the civil war, buried a considerable sum in gold and silver coins in a wood on the catae, which beneforth was styled the silver thicket; but having neglected to mark with accuracy the exact spot in which his treasure lay, neither Eustace nor his descendant wore ever able to recover it. His grandaughter married a Blackford, and it is from a member of that family that the Queen and the Irince Consort purchased the property of Usborne, being advised thereunto by Sir Robert Peel, then Secretary, of State. The property has been largely added to by its royal owners and now covers 2,000 acres, possessing capital preserves and magnificent timber.

The situation is unrivalled as a peaceful, smiling, highly quitivated English landscape. The house is creted on a gentle eminence sloping down to the Solent in velvety lawns, broad terraces, and lovely gardens. The house lised is not imposing, nor can it be said to belong to any present chaos of jurisdiction. There will be no excuse for maintaining the Consular Courts

On a recent afternoon a couple called at the reception room of Bellevue Hospital and inquired about a man who had died there on the previous night. Both were young, and a resemblance in features suggested that they were brother and sister. He was a cripple, one leg being shorter than the other, and looked siekly. He was very poorly dressed, as was also the sister. She was older than he, and her face was scamed with lines that told of privation. She did the talking for both.

"He was our father," she said in a tired yoice, referring to the dead man, "and we want to know how we can get the body."

The orderly suppressed a sigh as he replied:

"Pil give you the death certificate," he said. "If you are sure you will take the body away."

"Yes, we will take it," said the woman.

Her brother opened his mouth as if to say something, but she nudged him so hard with her elbow that it brought the tears to his eyes and made him shut his teeth very suddenly. The orderly looked very dubious, but he scured the certificate and gave it to the woman.

The was older than he, shid his teeth very suddenly. In another portion of the property stands the model farm of Burton, created by the Prince Consort, in which he took immense pride, which is certainly perfect of its kind. The Prince was exceedingly fond of Osborne, and as often as he could sparse the line would run down to the island, always planning and executing improvements. The Queen, charmed to the scalad, and wasked out, followed by her brother, who hooked my stilled.

repeatedly insisting on the advantages of a domain where "the seaboard was one's own exclusive brokerty."

Queen Victoria has Temained faithful to these early predilections as she has to all that related to her beloved consort; she ever longs for the repose and peaceof the island, for the sedentery charm of its half unofficial seclusion, and since of later years she has allowed herself to shake off some of the gloom that has so long darkened her life and saddened her solourage, it is not Osborne that she likes to hold those family fetus that rejoice her warm maternal heart.

It must, however, be acknowledged that it is sometimes hard for aged veterans and equally old Cabinet Ministers to take a four hours' journey from town, and to affront the by no means always pleasant crossing in midwinter, to respond to her Maiesty's invitations.

Although only eight miles from the mainland, the climate of the Isle of Wight is considerably milder even than that of the south coast; snow and frost are aimost unknown, and there never is any fog, while the proportion of bright sanshine is considerable. It would, therefore, not be strange I, with advancing years, Oncen Victoria were frankly to give the preference to Osborne over northern, bleak, and vold isalmonal.

Charity Brightens Their Honeymoon.

Councilman John McWaters and Mr. Charles Jones had perhaps the rarest experience of any of the gentlemen who were engaged in the work of distributing help to the poor. Sunday afternoon these two gentlemen had charge of a wagon together, and many loads of provisions and clothing did they deliver to deserving poor. The name of John Jones of 50 McDonneil street was given them, and they started to the place. They had some difficulty in finding the number designated, and inquired of some one near by where they could find No. 55.

"It's rite down dere," said a youth, pointing toward the place, "an' if you fellers will hurry up you'll see a weddin, 'cause John Jones is gettin' tied up torday," cause John Jones, a wirte man who follows the occupation of carpenter, came out. He was not richly dressed, but he was not on the extreme ragged edge by any means. charge of a wagon together, and many loads

edge by any means.
"What about getting married. John?" asked

"What about getting married. John?" asked Mr. Jones.
"Twe been a-thinkin' about it." replied Mr. John Jones, "an' I'm mighty glad to see you people come, cluse I need help.

Mr. McWaters and Mr. Jones delivered a liberal allowance of provisions to the groom, and a fer they had done so he said:

"Gentlemans, if you had got here about ten minutes sconer you could have been at the weddin. I got married before you drove up."

The two dispensers of charity offered their congratulations. They related the incident when they returned to headquarters, and Patrolmen Sewell and Ivy said that they had not left the house ten minutes when the other gentlemen arrived. So the bride and groom, were twice appoint.